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Changes in the European Union’s Regime of Recognizing and 
Enforcing Foreign Judgments and Transnational Litigation in the 
United States 
 
SAMUEL P. BAUMGARTNER*
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
When we speak about the law of transnational litigation in the United States, we 
usually refer to our own law as it applies to cross-border cases. After all, it is U.S. law, 
state or federal, that the courts of the United States apply in such cases.1 In other words, 
what we think of as transnational in this type of litigation is not the source of authority of 
the law applied, but the factual connection to another country that tends to be present, 
such as when one of the parties is domiciled abroad, some of the evidence is in foreign 
hands, or part of the activity involved has occurred on the territory of another nation. 
 
However, as practitioners of transnational litigation are aware, acting without 
knowledge of the relevant foreign laws and approaches in this area may result in 
unpleasant surprises. Litigation of this kind does not occur in a vacuum. U.S. judgments 
may need to be recognized or enforced abroad, or parallel litigation may take place in a 
foreign forum. Indeed, as recent empirical work suggests, the days when transnational 
litigation involving U.S. parties primarily or exclusively took place in U.S. courts – if 
they ever existed – may be about to come to an end.2 Thus, U.S. litigants may 
increasingly find themselves participating in proceedings abroad as well as at home. 
More generally, even unrelated cases can affect one another through transnational 
activity. Indeed, the laws and judicial rulings in one jurisdiction may have unintended 
consequences, both at home and abroad, through the activities of transnational actors; the 
effects of jurisprudential preferences elsewhere; and the consequences, sometimes subtle, 
 
 
 
* Professor and Director of Faculty Research and Development, University of Akron School of 
Law. I thank Vaughn Black and Janet Walker for helpful comments and questions. 
1 I exclude here foreign law applied through the operation of U.S. choice of law rules, state or 
federal. Cf. GARY B. BORN & PETER P. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES 
COURTS 613-750 (4th ed. 2007) (describing and analyzing U.S. choice of law rules). 
2 See Marcus S. Quintanilla & Christopher A. Whytock, The New Multipolarity in Transnational 
Litigation: Foreign Courts, Foreign Judgments, and Foreign Law, __ SOUTHWESTERN J. INT’L L. __ 
(forthcoming) (finding overall decline in alienage cases in all federal courts as well as overall increase of 
foreign judgments recognition cases and cases referencing Federal Rule 44.1 on the application of foreign 
law in the Southern District of New York). 
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of power politics.3 Thus, as I have suggested elsewhere, knowledge of the rules of 
transnational litigation of other countries as well as the litigation systems and ideational 
preferences underlying them is crucial for both litigants and law reformers to be 
successful with their work in this area.4
 
It is for this reason that I intend to shine a spotlight on both recent and upcoming 
developments in the recognition law of one of the biggest trading partners of the United 
States, the European Union. I shall focus here on the recognition law applicable to 
judgments from other EU states. I have elsewhere written on the way European nations 
treat judgments from the United States.5 As we shall see shortly, it is not too difficult for 
someone from the United States to sue or be sued in one of the member states of the 
European Union. With the European Union now at 27 members and potentially growing,6 
it may be just as important for lawyers and law reformers in the United States to know 
when and where within the Union a resulting judgment can be enforced and how as it is 
to know whether recognition and enforcement may occur in the United States. 
 
The relevant law of the European Union has changed considerably during the last 
few years, and several proposals for reform are currently being considered.7 Among these 
 
 
 
3 See, e.g., Samuel P. Baumgartner, Is Transnational Litigation Different?, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 1297, 1312-84 (2004) [hereinafter Baumgartner¸ Transnational Litigation]; Shi-Ling Hsu & 
Austen Parrish, Litigating Canada-U.S. Transboundary Harm: International Environmental Lawmaking 
and the Threat of Extraterritorial Reciprocity, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 57-63 (2007); Christopher A. Whytock, 
Domestic Courts and Global Governance, 84 TULANE L. REV. 67, 96-114 (2009). That power politics can 
have subtle consequences may need particular emphasis in this country. Probably the most important such 
consequence is resentment, which can result – consciously or subconsciously – in changes or 
interpretations of the laws of transnational litigation in other nations against the interests of litigants from, 
and institutions or process values of, the country in which power is exercised. See, e.g., Baumgartner, 
Transnational Litigation, supra, at 1352-53; Samuel P. Baumgartner, Human Rights and Civil Litigation in 
United States Courts: The Holocaust-Era Cases, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 835, 846-49 (2002). 
4 See Baumgartner, Transnational Litigation, supra note 3, at 1385-90; Samuel P. Baumgartner, 
Transnational Litigation in the United States: The Emergence of a New Field of Law, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 
793, 802-05 (2007) (reviewing BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 1). 
5 See Samuel P. Baumgartner, How Do U.S. Judgments Fare in Europe?, 40 GEO WASH. INT’L L. 
REV. 173 (2008) [hereinafter Baumgartner, U.S. Judgments]. See also Linda J. Silberman, Some Judgments 
on Judgements: A View from America, 19 KING’S L.J. 235 (2008). 
6 See, e.g., Europa, Gateway to the European Union: Countries, available at: 
http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm (listing 27 member states as well as five “candidate 
countries” under consideration for future EU membership). 
7 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Creating a 
European Account Preservation Order to facilitate cross-border debt recovery in civil and commercial 
matters, COM(2011) 445, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/comm-2011-445_en.pdf 
[hereinafter Proposal for an Account Preservation Order]; Proposal for a Council Regulation on 
jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial 
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proposals, it is particularly those regarding the so-called Brussels I Regulation that I am 
interested in here.8 Before I move on to the proposed reforms and an analysis of their 
potential impact, however, it is useful to recall the current EU regime of recognizing and 
enforcing judgments in Part II. For a better understanding of the proposed reforms, it is 
also useful to recognize that there have recently been deeper structural and conceptual 
changes in the EU law relating to the recognition and enforcement of judgments and in 
the EU law on transnational litigation more generally. I explore these changes in Part III. 
Having laid that foundation, I examine the proposed amendments in Part IV and conclude 
with an analysis of the significance of both these proposals and the ongoing structural and 
conceptual changes of the EU law on transnational litigation to litigants and law 
reformers in the United States. 
 
 
II. The Current Law on Recognizing and Enforcing the Judgments of Other 
EU Member States 
 
Presently, the main instrument controlling the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters from other EU member states is Regulation 
44/2001, usually referred to as the Brussels I Regulation.9 It is itself a revised and 
updated version of the Brussels Convention of 1968,10 a treaty negotiated at a time the 
European Community lacked the power to legislate in matters relating to cross-border 
litigation and civil procedure more generally.11 The drafters of the Brussels Convention 
 
 
 
property regimes, COM(2011) 126/2, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/civil/docs/com_2011_126_en.pdf [hereinafter Proposed Regulation on 
Matrimonial Property]; Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the 
recognition and enforcement of decisions regarding the property consequences of registered partnerships, 
COM(2011) 127/2, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/civil/docs/com_2011_127_en.pdf 
[hereinafter Proposed Regulation on Registered Partnership]; and Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters (Recast), COM(2010) 748 final, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/civil/docs/com_2010_748_en.pdf [hereinafter Proposed Brussels I 
Amendments]. 
8 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters, 2000 O.J. (L 012) 1 [hereinafter Brussels I Regulation]. 
9 Id. 
10 Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 1968 
O.J. (L 299) 32 [hereinafter Brussels Convention]. 
11 Article 220 of the Rome Treaty of 1957 did, however, urge member states to enter into 
negotiations “with a view to securing for the benefit of their nationals . . . the simplification of formalities 
governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments.” This became the impetus for the 
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took a big step forward in the long history of negotiating recognition treaties in Europe 
by combining provisions on the recognition and enforcement of judgments with rules on 
the jurisdiction to adjudicate of member state courts in transnational cases, along with 
provisions on parallel litigation.12 Another important step forward consisted in making 
the relatively new European Court of Justice (ECJ) the final arbiter in interpreting the 
Convention.13 The resulting treaty was generally considered a success – certainly among 
Continental Europeans. Accordingly, the regime of the Brussels Convention was later 
extended to the members of the European Free Trade Association through the parallel 
Convention of Lugano of 1988.14 In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam gave the European 
Community the power to legislate in the area of judicial cooperation, including the 
recognition of judgments,15 prompting the Community to recast the Brussels Convention, 
with some revisions, into Community law in the form of the Brussels I Regulation of 
2000.16 A new version of the Lugano Convention followed in 2007.17 Thus, the rules of 
 
 
 
negotiations leading to the Brussels Convention. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic 
Community, art. 220, Mar. 25, 1957 298 U.N.T.S. 11. 
12 See Brussels Convention, supra note 10, arts. 2-49. On the continental European history of 
negotiating recognition treaties and treaties in matters of transnational litigation more generally see, for 
example, SAMUEL P. BAUMGARTNER, THE PROPOSED HAGUE CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN 
JUDGMENTS: TRANSATLANTIC LAWMAKING FOR TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION 47-58 (2003). 
13 See Protocol of 3 June 1971 on the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Convention of 27 
September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 1978 
O.J. (L 304) 50. On the role played by the ECJ in the implementation of European Union law in the 
member states, a role the Court was able to expand extensively from the 1960s to the 1980s, see, for 
example, KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW, 1-32 (2001); Laurence R. 
Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 
273, 290-93 (1997). 
14 Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 
1988 O.J. (L 319) 40. 
15 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities and certain related acts, art. 73m, 1997 O.J. (L 340) 1. The Treaty of Amsterdam 
also introduced new complexities. According to additional protocols, this new power in the area of 
transnational litigation does not extend to Denmark, and the United Kingdom has a right to opt into or opt 
out of proposed new community legislation in this area. The United Kingdom has chosen to opt into most 
of the measures here discussed, including the proposed amendments to the Brussels I Regulation. Denmark 
entered into a treaty with the European Union agreeing to the extension of the Brussels I Regulation to 
Danish territory. See Agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Denmark on jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 2005 O.J. (L 299) 62 
(in force since July 1, 2007). 
16 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 8. 
17 See Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters, 2007 O.J. (L 339) 3. 
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the Brussels I Regulation apply not only in the 27 member states of the European Union, 
but also in Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland.18
 
As with the Brussels Convention, the Brussels I Regulation contains rules on 
jurisdiction to adjudicate, parallel proceedings, and the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments. The Regulation’s jurisdictional rules exclusively govern the 
jurisdiction to adjudicate of the courts of the member states in those transnational cases in 
which the defendant is domiciled in one of the member states. The domicile of the 
plaintiff, on the other hand, is for the most part irrelevant.19 Thus, for instance, in a suit 
by a U.S. plaintiff against a defendant from the European Union, the Regulation controls 
and only the courts of the member state in which the defendant is domiciled have 
jurisdiction.20 Indeed, according to the ECJ’s controversial Owusu decision, the 
Regulation may control even when both plaintiff and defendant are domiciled in the same 
member state as long as the litigation has “certain connections” to another state.21 In 
Owusu, a case brought by one U.K. domiciliary against another involving an accident in 
Jamaica, this meant that the U.K. courts had jurisdiction under article 2(1) of the 
Regulation and thus had to refrain from applying the English forum non conveniens 
doctrine in favor of litigation between the same parties in Jamaica.22 As the Court pointed 
out, the Regulation itself does not provide for forum non conveniens dismissals.23 
Instead, it deals with parallel litigation exclusively by means of a lis pendens rule and 
then only when the parallel suit is pending in another member state.24
 
 
 
18 See Traités internationaux pour lesquelles la Suisse assume les fonctions de dépositaire, 
Convention concernant la compétance judiciaire, la reconnaissance et l’execution des décisions en matière 
civile et commerciales, available at 
http://www.eda.admin.ch/etc/medialib/downloads/edazen/topics/intla/intrea/depch/misc/conlug2.Par.0007.
File.tmp/mt_110302_lug2part_f.pdf. (listing the member states of the Lugano Convention of 2007). 
19 See Groupe Josi Reinsurance Co., SA v. Universal General Ins. Co., Case C-412-98, 2000 
E.C.R. I-5925, paras. 33-61. 
20 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 8, at art. 2(1). 
21 Owusu v. Jackson, Case C-281-02, 2005 E.C.R. I-1383. To be precise, the ECJ in Owusu and 
many other cases cited here interpreted the Brussels Convention, not the Regulation. See id. at para. 1. 
However, none of the changes made to the Convention in the Regulation would suggest that the Court’s 
interpretation of the Regulation would be any different today.  
22 Id. at paras. 37-46. 
23 Id. at para. 37. 
24 If the same cause of action between the same parties is pending in the court of another member 
state, the court later seized must stay the proceedings before it and then dismiss them as soon as the court 
first seized has decided that it has jurisdiction. If the case pending before another member state is merely 
related, stay and dismissal are optional. See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 8, at arts. 27-28. However, 
the Regulation does not provide for any lis pendens stays in favor of litigation in the courts of a non-
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On the other hand, the Brussels I Regulation does not control and, hence, the 
member states can apply their own rules on the jurisdiction to adjudicate when the 
defendant is not a domiciliary of one of the EU member states. These domestic rules on 
jurisdiction include various exorbitant jurisdictional bases that may not be used against 
defendants from other member states.25 Thus, for instance, U.S. parties may find 
themselves sued in France simply because the plaintiff is French,26 in the United 
Kingdom just because they were served with process there,27 and in Austria only because 
they own property that is currently present in that country, as long as the amount in 
controversy is not unreasonably larger than the value of the property.28
 
The Regulation’s provisions on the recognition and enforcement of judgments, 
which I am primarily interested in here, apply whenever a judgment from one member 
state is to be recognized or enforced in another.29 Recognition occurs automatically upon 
entry of judgment in the originating state, although non-recognizability can always be 
raised as an incidental objection where relevant or in a separate application for a 
declaratory judgment.30 The judgment will not be recognized if (1) it manifestly violates 
 
 
 
member state. Following Owusu, this means that such litigation is simply to be disregarded. On lis pendens 
stays in the United States, by comparison, see, for example, BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 1, at 522-40. 
25 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 8, at art. 3(2). For a general discussion of these rules and 
their use in practice see Arnaud Nuyts, Study on Residual Jurisdiction, General Report, 58-63 (2007), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_residual_jurisdiction_en.pdf 
26 See CODE CIVIL art. 14 (Fr.). Although the language of article 14 provides for jurisdiction over 
foreigners only for “the performance of obligations contracted [by them] … with a French person,” the 
French courts have interpreted the provision to extend jurisdiction over virtually every cause of action 
brought by a French national against a foreigner. However, French litigants have rarely sought an 
application of the provision to the full potential of exorbitance that this interpretation suggests, mostly 
suing only if the defendant owns property in France or any other EU country. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont 
& John R.B. Palmer, French Article 14 Jurisdiction, Viewed From the United States, in DE TOUS 
HORIZONS: MÉLANGES XAVIER BLANC-JOUVAN 473, [] (Société de Legislation Comparée 2005). 
27 See, e.g., RICHARD FENTIMAN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LITIGATION 361-62 (2010). 
28 See JURISDIKTIONSNORM § 99(1) (Au.). Note that some of the exorbitant bases of jurisdiction 
previously in existence in some of the member states have either been abolished or significantly limited. 
Thus, for instance, The Netherlands abolished jurisdiction based on the Dutch domicile of the plaintiff in 
2002. Similarly, both Germany and Austria used to permit plaintiffs to sue anyone who owned property 
within the country for any claim, including claims unrelated to that property. As indicated in the text, 
however, Austria has since limited this jurisdictional basis to claims that are not unreasonably larger than 
the value of the property; and the German Bundesgerichtshof now requires the claim to have a sufficient 
connection to Germany for application of section 23 of its Code of Civil Procedure. See 115 BGHZ 94 
(1992). 
29 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 8, at arts. 33(1) & 38(1). 
30 Id. at art. 33. 
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the public policy of the recognition state; (2) in case of a default judgment, the defendant 
was not served with process “in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to 
arrange for his defence” (unless the defendant has since had the opportunity to challenge 
the judgment in the rendering state)31 or (3) if the judgment is inconsistent with a prior 
judgment between the same parties either in the recognition state or in another EU-
member state.32 The jurisdiction to adjudicate of the rendering court, however, is not 
generally subject to reexamination by the recognition court.33 Exceptions to this rule are 
largely in place to reinforce the provisions on exclusive jurisdiction and those protecting 
consumers, and holders of insurance policies.34 Since the Brussels Regulation contains 
jurisdictional rules as well as rules on the recognition and enforcement of judgments, and 
since the member states generally trust one another in the application of those rules, the 
reasoning goes, no review of the application of those rules by the rendering court is 
needed at the time of recognition.35 Notice what this means for defendants from non-
member countries such as the United States: Not only can the courts of the EU-member 
states take jurisdiction over such defendants on the basis of exorbitant jurisdictional rules 
that are outlawed in the inter-community context, but the emanating judgments must be 
recognized and enforced in all of the other member states without further examination of 
the originating court’s jurisdiction. U.S. observers have long since criticized this as 
unnecessary discrimination.36
 
 While the recognition of a judgment from another member state is automatic, 
enforcement of such a judgment requires a declaration of enforceability (in the United 
Kingdom, the registration of the judgment for purposes of enforcement in the relevant 
 
 
 
31 The exception in brackets was introduced by the Brussels I Regulation and did not exist in the 
Brussels Convention. See Brussels Convention, supra note 10, art. 27(2). It does not apply to judgments to 
be recognized in, or emanating from, Swiss courts because of a Swiss reservation to Article 34(2) of the 
Lugano Convention of 2007. See Notification aux Parties et Signataires de la Convention concernant la 
compétance judicaire, la reconnaissance et l’exécution des décisions en matière civile et commerciale, faite 
à Lugano le 30 octobre 2007, available at: 
http://www.dfae.admin.ch/etc/medialib/downloads/edazen/topics/intla/intrea/depch/misc/conlug2.Par.0057.
File.tmp/mt_101027_lugnotif101027_fr.pdf. 
32 Id. at at art. 34. 
33 Id. at at art. 35(3). 
34 Id. at art. 35(1). 
35 See, e.g., Turner v. Grovit, Case C-159-02, 2005 E.C.R. I-3565, paras. 24-26. 
36 See, e.g., Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A New 
Approach for the Hague Conference?, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 271, 278 (Summer 1994); Friedrich K. 
Juenger, Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States and in the European Communities: A Comparison, 82 
MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1211-12 (1984); Kurt H. Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora  in Treaties on 
Recognition of Judgments: The Common Market Draft, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1995 (1967);  
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jurisdiction).37 The declaration of enforceability (also called exequatur) is granted ex 
parte and can be joined with ex parte preliminary measures of protection.38 Unlike the 
Brussels Convention, the Regulation no longer requires or even permits the consideration 
of the recognizability of the judgment for purposes of issuing the declaration of 
enforceability. Instead, the declaration must be issued whenever the applicant submits 
both a copy of the judgment and a certification of enforceability of the judgment given by 
the court of origin.39 After the decision on the declaration has been served on the 
judgment creditor, either party may appeal, in most member states to a court at the 
appellate level.40 At this appeal, the judgment debtor is heard with the claim that the 
recognition requirements are not met.41 Thus, recognizability is considered only in those 
cases in which the judgment debtor appeals the declaration of enforceability. According 
to a recent study, this occurs in only about one to five percent of all cases, suggesting that 
the declaration of enforceability is usually granted as a matter of course and without 
lengthy proceedings.42
 
Any judgment that is enforceable in the rendering state will be declared 
enforceable in this fashion.43 This particularly means that even preliminary and 
 
 
 
37 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 8, at art. 38. 
38 Id. at at arts. 41 & 47(2). 
39 Id. at art. 41. 
40 Id. at arts. 42-43. 
41 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 8, at art. 45. Professor Oberhammer usefully distinguishes 
the “title import function” from the “title inspection function” of the declaration of enforceability. The 
former officially renders the foreign judgment a domestic one, the latter primarily serves to examine the 
foreign judgment for potential defects. See Paul Oberhammer, The Abolition of Exequatur, 30 PRAXIS DES 
INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS [hereinafter IPRAX] 197, 197-199 (2010). From this 
perspective, the ex parte granting of the declaration of enforceability serves the “title import function,” 
which can be, and in a few countries is, exercised by a registrar without the involvement of a court. See, 
e.g., Burkhard Hess, Thomas Pfeiffer & Peter Schlosser, Report on the Application of Regulation Brussels 
I in the Member States 222, final version September 2007, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_application_brussels_1_en.pdf. An appeal against the 
granting of the declaration by the judgment debtor, when it occurs, usually serves the “title inspection 
function.” 
42 See Hess, Pfeiffer & Schlosser, supra note 41, at 221. These numbers must be treated with some 
caution, however. While they are based on extensive information obtained from particular courts within 
some of the member states, they are simply estimates “obtained from lawyers” in others; and there are 
seven countries from which no information is available on this issue. See id. at 221; Study JLS/C4/2005/03, 
Compilation of all National Reports, Questionnaire No. 1: Collection of Statistical Data, 26-29, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_bxl1_compilation_quest_1_en.pdf. 
43 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 8, at arts. 32 & 38. 
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protective measures can be enforced in the other member states.44 Moreover, this 
includes preliminary and protective measures granted by a court that bases its jurisdiction 
solely on Article 31 of the Brussels I Regulation, which permits any court of a member 
state to grant such measures under domestic law even where the courts of that state do not 
have jurisdiction over the substance of the matter pursuant to the Regulation’s 
jurisdictional provisions.45 On the other hand, however, the ECJ held in Denilauer v. 
Couchet, interpreting the Brussels Convention, that the recognition requirement of proper 
notice in what is now article 34(2) of the Regulation prevents the enforcement of 
measures issued without hearing the defendant.46 Ex parte measures are therefore not 
currently enforceable in the other EU states. 
 
 
III. Recent Structural and Conceptual Changes 
 
 Overall, the Brussels I Regulation leads to the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments from other member states in an effective and quite efficient manner, thus 
distinguishing its provisions sharply from some of the member state laws applicable to 
judgments from outside the European Union.47 However, the Brussels I Regulation is not 
the only EU instrument governing the recognition and enforcement of judgments. Much 
has happened since the Brussels Convention made up the sole piece of Community law in 
the area of transnational litigation. To begin, the scope of application of the Brussels I 
Regulation is limited, as was that of the Brussels Convention, to civil and commercial 
matters and further excludes litigation regarding status claims, matrimonial property 
regimes, wills and succession, bankruptcy, social security, and arbitration.48 The drafters 
 
 
 
44 See, e.g., Patrick Wautelet, Article 32, in EUROPEAN COMMENTARIES ON PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: BRUSSELS I REGULATION 535, 541 (Ulrich Magnus & Peter Mankowski eds., 2007). 
45 The ECJ has, however, had to put limits on the kinds of measures that can still be called 
“preliminary and protective” in order to be recognizable. See St. Paul Dairy Ind. NV v. Unibel Excser 
BVBA, Case C-104-03, 2005 E.C.R. I-3481; Mietz v. Intership Yachting, Case C-99-96, 1999 E.C.R. I-
2277; Van Uden Maritime BV v. Deco-Line, Case C-391-95, 1998 E.C.R. I-7091. 
46 Denilauer v. Couchet, Case C-125-79, 1980 E.C.R. 1553. 
47 See, e.g., Hess, Pfeiffer & Schlosser, supra note 41, at 22 (“Overall, the national reports show a 
considerable efficiency of the proceedings: Getting a decision on exequatur is a matter of a few weeks, in 
some Member States, the decision is granted in a few days.”); Baumgartner, supra note 5, at 183-98 
(discussing the limitations on the recognizability of judgments from non-EU-member states that extist in 
some of the EU nations). 
48 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 8, at art. 1. On the long-standing European civil law 
tradition of limiting recognition to judgments in civil and commercial matters see, for instance, Gerhard 
Walter & Samuel P. Baumgartner, The Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments Outside the Scope of 
the Brussels and Lugano Conventions, in RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS OUTSIDE THE 
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of the Brussels Convention had hoped that separate conventions could be negotiated in 
some of these areas at a later date, when the differences among member state laws would 
be easier to overcome. However, it was not until the Community received legislative 
power in the area of civil justice generally in 1997, thus giving it the power to legislate by 
majority vote, that discussion of these instruments began in earnest. Thus, the 
Community adopted the Brussels II Regulation on jurisdiction and recognition in matters 
of divorce, legal separation, and parental responsibility (amended in 2003) and the 
Regulation on cross-border insolvency proceedings in 2000 and the Regulation on 
jurisdiction, applicable law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments relating to 
maintenance obligations in 2009.49 Moreover, after lengthy consideration, the 
Commission has recently released proposals for regulations on the jurisdiction, applicable 
law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments regarding both matrimonial property 
regimes and registered partnerships (civil partnerships or civil unions in U.S. parlance).50
 
But even within the Brussels I Regulation’s scope of application, new instruments 
have been adopted that preempt application of the Regulation. Thus, regulations each on 
uncontested claims, small claims, and order of payment proceedings permitting creditors 
quickly to obtain a judgment in cases in which the defendant does not object lead to 
judgments that are directly enforceable in the other member states.51 Further instruments 
 
 
 
SCOPE OF THE BRUSSELS AND LUGANO CONVENTIONS 1, 12-15 (Gerhard Walter & Samuel P. Baumgartner 
eds., 2000). 
49 See Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, 
recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, 
2009 O.J. (L 7) 1; Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and matters of parental 
responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, 2003 O.J. (L 338) 1; Council Regulation (EC) No 
1346/2000 of May 29 2000 on insolvency proceedings, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1 [hereinafter Insolvency 
Regulation]. 
50 See Proposed Regulation on Matrimonial Property, supra note 7; Proposed Regulation on 
Registered Partnerships, supra note 7. 
51 Regulation (EC) No. 861/2007 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 July 2007 
establishing a European Small Claims Procedure, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 1 [hereinafter Small Claims 
Regulation]; Regulation (EC) No. 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council of December 12, 
2006, creating a European order for payment procedure, 2006 O.J. (L 399) 1 [hereinafter Order of Payment 
Regulation]; Regulation (EC) No. 805/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of April 2004 
creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims, 2004 O.J. (L 143) 15 [hereinafter 
Uncontested Claims Regulation]. Uncontested claims for purposes of the latter regulation roughly are 
monetary claims to which the debtor can be deemed to have agreed and that thus end in a consent 
judgment, judicially approved settlement, or an “authentic instrument” admitting to the debt or which have 
been prosecuted in a civil proceeding in a member state in which the debtor has failed to appear to contest 
the claim and that thus end in a default judgment. See Uncontested Claims Regulation, supra, art. 3. The 
order of payment procedure, on the other hand, permits a creditor who believes to have an uncontested 
cross-border claim for the payment of a sum of money to obtain an enforceable judgment in no more than 
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of this sort are being considered, for instance, the creation of a European account 
preservation order to attach debtors’ bank accounts to secure enforcement of an 
anticipated or existing judgment in cross-border litigation.52
 
These recent changes and the proposals currently pending, however, are merely 
manifestations of a larger conceptual reorientation with regard to the Brussels I 
Regulation and transnational litigation more generally. First, the EU institutions no 
longer view the Brussels I Regulation simply as the Brussels Convention in the guise of 
EU legislation – if they ever really did – but rather as part of the larger enterprise of 
European integration. In the early 1990s, scholars began to argue that procedural rules 
can hinder inter-Community trade as much as non-tariff barriers arising from economic 
legislation and thus that transnational litigation required harmonization beyond that 
achieved through the Brussels Convention.53 It is on the basis of this argument that the 
negotiators of the Amsterdam Treaty adopted a Community competence to legislate in 
matters of transnational litigation “in so far as necessary for the proper functioning of the 
 
 
 
three months. The creditor simply fills out a form identifying the debtor, sum of money owed, and a brief 
description of the cause of action and the evidence supporting the claim, thus obviating the need for filing a 
complaint in a regular civil action. The court then orders the defendant either to pay the sum claimed or to 
file an objection. In the latter case, the plaintiff can overcome the objection only by beginning an ordinary 
civil proceeding. But if the defendant neither pays nor objects within 30 days, the court declares the order 
an enforceable judgment. See Order of Payment Regulation, supra, arts. 7-18. The resulting judgment in 
the latter case, and the consent judgment, judicially approved settlement, or “authentic instrument” in the 
uncontested claims procedure are then enforceable within the other member states. See id., art. 19; 
Uncontested Claims Regulation, supra, art. 5. 
52 See Proposal for an Account Preservation Order, supra note 7. 
53 See, e.g., Manfred Wolf, Abbau prozessualer Schranken im europäischen Binnenmarkt, in 
WEGE ZU EINEM EUROPÄISCHEN ZIVILPROZESSRECHT 35 (Wolfgang Grunsky et al., eds., 1992). The ECJ, 
with the help of referring German courts, was the first European institution to apply the EC Treaty’s trade 
requirements to domestic rules on transnational litigation. In a series of decisions throughout the 1990s, the 
Court declared a number of national provisions treating litigants from other member states differently from 
domestic litigants to be in violation of the EC Treaty’s non-discrimination rules. See Hayes v. 
Kronenberger Gmbh, Case C-323-95, 1997 E.C.R. I-1711 (German provision requiring foreign plaintiffs to 
post a bond); Data Delecta Aktiebolag v. MSL Dynamics Ltd., Case C-43-95, 1996 E.C.R. I-4661 
(Swedish provision requiring same); Mund & Fester v. Hatrex Int’l Transport, Case C-398-92, 1994 E.C.R. 
I-467 (German provision permitting pre-judgment attachment of personal property against foreign 
defendant who is likely to be judgment proof in Germany); Hubbard v. Hamburger, Case C-20-92, 1993 
E.C.R. I-3777 (German provision requiring foreign plaintiffs to post a bond). But see E.D. Srl. v. 
Fenocchio, Case C-412/97, 1999 E.C.R. I-3845 (upholding as conforming with the EC Treaty the limitation 
of the Italian order of payment procedure to claims against defendants who can be served with process in 
Italy, reasoning that “the possibility that nationals would therefore hesitate to sell goods to purchasers 
established in other Member states is too uncertain and indirect for that national provision to be regarded as 
liable to hinder trade between Member States”). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
                                                
internal market” in 1997.54 Armed with this new power, the Community proceeded to 
adopt not only the Brussels I and Brussels II Regulations and the Regulation on 
Insolvency Proceedings, but also regulations on the cross-border service of process and 
taking of evidence as well as directives on legal aid and mediation in transnational 
cases.55 Moreover, the European Council and the Commission have since articulated 
more specific policies for civil justice flowing from the goal of economic integration. 
These policies include the free movement of judgments; equal access to justice in cases 
crossing member-state boundaries; and mutual trust of the laws and proceedings of other 
member states.56 Not surprisingly, the ECJ has interpreted the provisions of the Brussels I 
Regulation in light of these policies as well as in the context of EU legislation 
implementing other policies to the extent they touch on matters of jurisdiction and the 
recognition of judgments.57 The result is an integrated system and an integrated 
 
 
 
54 Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community [hereinafter TEC], 
art. 65, 2006 O.J. (C 321) 37. This Community competence has since been somewhat expanded in the 
Treaty of Lisbon, primarily by lengthening the list of specific powers of the Union and by replacing the 
language “in so far as necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market” with “particularly when 
necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market.” See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union [hereinafter TFEU], art. 81, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47 (emphasis supplied). 
The term used in both treaties is “judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-border implications.” 
See art. 65 TEC, supra, and art. 81 TFEU, supra. A reading of both the text of these articles and their 
history as described in the text, however, indicates that this narrow term really encompasses most or all of 
inter-member state transnational litigation. 
55 See Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on 
certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters; Regulation (EC) No. 1393/2007 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on the service in the Member States of 
judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters, and repealing Council Regulation (EC) 
No. 1348/2000, 2007 O.J. (L 324) 97 (replacing a version of the Regulation from 2000) [hereinafter 
Service Regulation]; Council Directive 2002/8/EC of 27 January 2003 to improve access to justice in cross-
border disputes by establishing minimum common rules relating to legal aid for such disputes, 2003 O.J. (L 
26) 41; Council Regulation (EC) No. 1206/2001 on cooperation between the courts of the Member States in 
the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters, 2001 O.J. (L 174) 1. 
56 See European Council: The Stockholm Programme – An Open and Secure Europe Serving and 
Protecting Citizens, 2010 O.J. (C 115) 1, 13-16 [hereinafter Stockholm Programme]; Communication from 
the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – The Hague Programme: Ten priorities for 
the next five years. The partnership for European renewal in the field of Freedom, Security, and Justice, 
COM(2005) 0184 final [hereinafter Hague Programme]; Tampere European Council 15 and 16 October 
1999, Presidency Conclusions, paras. 33-34, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm. 
57 See, e.g., Hypoteční Banca v. Lindner, Case C-327-10, paras. 44-54  (Nov. 11, 2011), available 
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62010CJ0327:EN:HTML (interpreting 
the domicile provision of Article 59 so as to “strengthen[] the legal protection of persons established in the 
European Union” and thus to grant them an effective right to sue); Turner v. Grovit, Case C-159-02, 2005 
E.C.R. I-3565, paras. 24-26 (interpreting the jurisdictional provisions of the Brussels Convention on the 
basis of the “trust which the Contracting States accord to one another’s legal systems and judicial 
institutions”); Gemeente Steenbergen v. Baten, Case C-271-00, 2002 E.C.R. I-10489, paras. 41-49 
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interpretation that can be increasingly difficult for outsiders to understand in all of its 
ramifications. 
 
The second conceptual change has been the move from addressing specific 
aspects of transnational litigation to viewing cross-border litigation in its entirety as a 
proper area for EU legislation. As the Commission stated in its Hague Programme of 
2004, “[a] European area of justice is more than an area where judgements obtained in 
one Member State are recognised and enforced in other Member States, but rather an area 
where effective access to justice is guaranteed in order to obtain and enforce judicial 
decisions.”58 Earlier instruments under the new EU competence in the area of 
transnational litigation were limited to harmonizing or unifying domestic proceedings to 
the extent they touched directly on cross-border cases.59 Thus, for instance, the Brussels I 
Convention establishes the conditions and procedures under which foreign judgments 
must be recognized and accepted for enforcement, but remains silent on, and thus leaves 
to member state law, questions such as what preclusive effects a recognized judgment has 
or how a money judgment is to be enforced once declared enforceable.60 The more recent 
regulations on uncontested claims and order of payment proceedings, on the other hand, 
create European procedural instruments from start to finish, displacing member-state law 
and practice where they apply. Thus, for instance, a German who claims to be owed 
€10,000 by an Italian merchant can either litigate the claim in Germany under German 
 
 
 
(interpreting the social security exception in Article 1 of the Brussels Convention with help of the 
definition of the term “social security” in Council Regulation No 1408/71 on the application of social 
security schemes to employed persons). On the interpretation of various pieces of EU legislation on inter-
Community transnational litigation by the ECJ see, for example, Burkhard Hess, Methoden der 
Rechtsfindung im Europäischen Zivilprozessrecht, 26 IPRAX 348 (2006). 
58 Hague Programme, supra note 56, at 2.3(9). 
59 This included both instruments unifying more traditional aspects of transnational litigation – 
such as judicial jurisdiction, service of process, gathering of evidence and the recognition of judgments –
and the harmonization of aspects of transnational litigation that touch on issues of cross-border trade and 
access to justice. For the latter, see, e.g., Directive 2000/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 29 June 2000 on combating late payment in commercial transactions, art. 5, 2000 O.J. (L 200) 
35 (requiring member states to “ensure that an enforceable title can be obtained, irrespective of the amount 
of debt, normally within 90 calendar days of the lodging of the creditor’s action” if “the debt or aspects of 
the procedure are not disputed”); Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 
May 1998 on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests, 1998 O.J. (L 166) 51 (mandating that 
consumer groups organized under the laws of one member state be given standing to sue in another 
member state); Council Directive 97/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of January 27 
1997 on cross-border credit transfers, art. 10, 1997 O.J. (L 43) 25 (requiring member states to “ensure that 
there are adequate and effective procedures for the settlement of disputes” in cross-border credit transfers). 
60 This overlap has created some thorny questions on how best to integrate the European 
procedures into the very different domestic procedural and enforcement systems of the member states. See, 
e.g., Oberhammer, supra note 41, at 198-199. 
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law (if German courts have jurisdiction under the Brussels I Regulation), have the 
resulting German judgment declared enforceable in Italy under the Brussels I Regulation, 
and then have the judgment enforced under Italian enforcement rules. Alternatively, the 
German claimant can request a European order of payment in German court, which, if not 
paid or objected to by the Italian defendant within the relevant time period, becomes 
immediately enforceable in Italy in the same fashion as an Italian judgment (with a few 
minimum requirements set by EU law).61 Similarly, under the proposed Regulation on 
Account Preservation Orders, the claimant can choose to proceed with a European 
Account Preservation Order that not only supplants domestic member-state law on 
attachment and garnishment, but is also immediately enforceable in all member states and 
has the effects set out by the proposed Regulation.62
 
Obviously, these new European instruments supplant not only domestic member-
state law, but also the provisions of the Brussels I Regulation. Thus, the scope of 
application of the Regulation has shrunk and is likely to diminish further in the future. In 
other ways, however, the Regulation has become more important. Some of the new 
instruments, for instance, incorporate portions of the Brussels I Regulation. Thus, the 
Order of Payment Regulation simply provides that jurisdiction to adjudicate to issue a 
European order of payment “shall be determined in accordance with the relevant 
Community Law, in particular Regulation (EC) No 44/2001.”63 More extensively, the 
 
 
 
61 See Order of Payment Regulation, supra note 51, arts. 19-28 and supra note 51. I use this 
example partly to showcase yet another complication. For it is not at all clear that the claimant is better off 
using the European order of payment procedure in this case. Germany has long had its own version of such 
a procedure, the so-called Mahnverfahren, which deviates from the new European one in a number of 
respects. It is thus possible that, at least in the short term, the claimant would be better off using the 
German Mahnverfahren, with which the German courts are familiar, than the European order of payment 
procedure, with which they are not. See, e.g., Gerhard Wagner, Harmonization of Civil Procedure – Policy 
Perspectives, in CIVIL LITIGATION IN A GLOBALISING WORLD 93, 99 (X.E. Kramer & R.C. vanRhee eds., 
2012). Recognizing this problem, the German legislature has designated a single court in Berlin to have 
jurisdiction to issue European orders of payment. See § 1087 ZPO (Ger.). As a result, that court should gain 
the necessary experience effectively to deal with the new procedure in the not-too-distant future. See, e.g., 
Xandra E. Kramer, Enhancing Enforcement in the European Union: The European Order for Payment 
Procedure and Its Implementation in the Member States, Particularly in Germany, the Netherlands, and 
England, in ENFORCEMENT AND ENFORCEABILITY: TRADITION AND REFORM 17, 30 (C.H. vanRhee & Alan 
Uzelac eds., 2010). 
62 See Proposal for an Account Preservation Order, supra note 7, arts. 5-45. There is an exception 
to the immediate enforceability of the Order in other member states: Orders that are not granted by a court 
“in the member state where proceedings on the substance of the matter have to be brought in accordance 
with the applicable rules on jurisdiction” are enforceable only in the state of issuance. See id. arts. 6(2), 
14(1) & 23. 
63 Order of Payment Regulation, supra note 51, art. 6(1). This means, for instance, that the order 
of payment procedure can be used against U.S. defendants if the rendering court has jurisdiction under 
domestic member-state law. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28. 
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Insolvency Regulation provides that certain judgments rendered during transnational 
insolvency proceedings, including “preservation measures taken after the opening of 
insolvency proceedings,” be “enforced [in other member states] in accordance with” the 
relevant provisions of the Brussels I Regulation,64 even though that Regulation would not 
otherwise govern judgments of this sort.65 Moreover, the newer Community instruments 
in transnational litigation increasingly use particular terms of the Brussels I Regulation as 
reference points, both explicitly and impliedly. Thus, for instance, the Small Claims 
Regulation, the Order of Payment Regulation, and the proposed Account Preservation 
Order Regulation refer to the definition of “domicile” in Articles 59 and 60 of the 
Brussels I Regulation for various purposes.66 Similarly, many of the new instruments are 
limited in their scope to “civil and commercial matters,” a term that has no precise analog 
in common law jurisdictions, but which has developed a particular meaning through the 
ECJ’s rich case law interpreting the same term in the Brussels Convention and Brussels I 
Regulation.67 In short, the Brussels I Regulation has become, according to a recent 
statement by the Commission, “the matrix of [transnational litigation] in the European 
Union.”68
 
The sum of these developments has been a seismic shift over the last half century 
from treating matters of transnational litigation as virtually irrelevant to the enterprise of 
European integration to making them one of its focal points; from considering only the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments worthy of possible uniform treatment to 
opening all of transnational litigation for potential EU regulation; and, more recently, 
from unifying only the most immediate aspects of transnational litigation to creating 
uniform legislation for the entirety of certain transnational proceedings. The logical 
endpoint of this development, though admittedly still far in the future, is likely to be the 
 
 
 
64 Insolvency Regulation, supra note 49, art. 25(1). 
65 See supra text accompanying note 48. 
66 See Small Claims Regulation, supra note 51, arts. 3(2); Order of Payment Regulation, supra 
note 51, arts. 3(2) & 6(2); Proposal for an Account Preservation Order, supra note 7, art. 4(15). For further 
examples see Hess, Pfeiffer & Schlosser, supra note 41, at 29-30. 
67 See, e.g., Pippa Rogerson, Article 1, in EUROPEAN COMMENTARIES ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, supra note 44, 45, 51-56. On the limitation of the applicability of the Brussels I Convention to civil 
and commercial matters see supra text accompanying note 48. 
68 Proposed Brussels I Amendments, supra note 7, at 3. As indicated supra note 54, the term used 
in Brussels is “civil judicial cooperation” rather than “transnational litigation.” See Proposed Brussels I 
Amendments, supra note 7, at 3. 
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displacement of all member state law applicable to transnational cases, no matter what 
the type of proceeding.69
 
 
IV. The Proposed Amendments to the Brussels I Regulation 
 
It is against this backdrop that the Commission has proposed a number of changes 
to the Brussels I Regulation. The most important proposed changes relating to 
recognition and enforcement of judgments are (1) the abolition of the declaration of 
enforceability; (2) the limitation of the public policy defense to matters of procedure; (3) 
the abolition of the defense of improper notice, requiring the defendant to raise the 
defense with the rendering court; (4) the abolition of the remaining cases in which a 
jurisdictional defense is available; (5) changes in the scope of recognizability and 
enforceability of provisional and protective measures; (6) and the extension of the 
Regulation’s jurisdictional regime to defendants from non-member countries.70 In short, 
the proposal intends to further implement the policies of integration and free movement 
of judgments, thus bringing the treatment of judgments from other member states closer 
 
 
 
69 Thus far, attempts to extend procedural harmonization and unification efforts to purely domestic 
cases have been strongly resisted. In 1993, a group of European civil procedure scholars proposed the 
harmonization of various parts of domestic European civil procedure by way of an EC directive. See 
MARCEL STORME, APPROXIMATION OF JUDICIARY LAW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (1994). But the proposal 
was greeted with anything but enthusiasm and was never acted upon by the Commission. Similarly, the 
initial attempt of the Commission to expand the scope of application of the Order of Payment and Small 
Claims regulations, supra note 51, to domestic as well as cross-border cases was strongly resisted as 
beyond the constitutional powers of the Union and thus was ultimately dropped. See, e.g., Wagner, supra 
note 61, at 97-98. The Commission has, however, been successful in gaining passage of Directive 
2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights, 2004 O.J. (L 195) 16, which harmonizes member state procedural law in both 
transnational and domestic intellectual property cases in certain respects. The Commission was able to do 
so by casting the directive as a legal instrument regulating substantive intellectual property law along with 
procedural enforcement mechanisms. See Wagner, supra, at 102. I suspect it did not hurt that the Directive 
had a precursor in the minimum requirements for domestic procedural rules established by the WTO’s 
TRIPS Agreement. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments – 
Results of the Uruguay Round; arts. 41-50, vol 31, 33. I.L.M. 81 (1994). 
70 Further important proposed changes include provisions to improve the enforcement of forum 
selection and arbitration clauses, the introduction of a lis pendens provision in favor of litigation pending in 
a non-member state; and various provisions mandating a certain level of cooperation between the courts of 
different member states involved in the same matter. See Proposed Brussels I Amendments, supra note 7, at 
3-9. 
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to that of domestic ones.71 The first five changes are also explicitly based on the policy of 
trusting the law, procedure, and practice in the other member states.72
 
The first of these, the abolition of the declaration of enforceability sounds like a 
bolder move than it really is.73 Recall that this declaration is currently granted ex parte 
and that grounds for non-recognition are considered by a court in the recognition state 
only when the judgment debtor appeals the declaration after having been notified.74 
Recall further that, from what we know, very few judgment debtors actually bother to do 
so.75 The Commission thus appears to conclude that most judgment creditors have to 
waste the time and resources to obtain a judicial document that certifies something few 
debtors contest.76 These resources include the cost of the declaration itself,77 costs of 
translating the relevant documents,78 and costs for retaining local counsel.79 Even though 
 
 
 
71 See Proposed Brussels I Amendments, supra note 7, at 4. 
72 However, the Commission does not consider that trust to exist in matters of defamation and 
group litigation and thus currently excludes these two areas from the proposed elimination of exequatur and 
the defenses of improper notice and substantive public policy violations. See Proposed Brussels I 
Amendments, supra note 7, at 6-7. 
73 Much of the opposition against this proposal is really directed against the concomitant proposal 
to abolish several of the currently existing grounds for refusing recognition. See infra text accompanying 
notes 81-92. However, nothing prevents the European Union from abolishing the declaration of 
enforceability while retaining the ability of the judgment debtor to challenge the recognition of the 
judgment on all currently available grounds against recognition through some other procedure. See, e.g., 
Xandra E. Kramer, Abolition of Exequatur under the Brussels I Regulation: effecting and protecting rights 
in the European judicial area, 2011 NEDERLANDS INTERNATIONAAL PRIVAATRECHT 633, 641 (2011); 
Oberhammer, supra note 41, at 199-200. 
74 See supra text accompanying notes 37-41. 
75 See supra text accompanying note 42. 
76 See Proposed Brussels I Amendments, supra note 7, at 3 (positing that the declaration of 
enforceability “remains an obstacle to the free circulation of judgments which entails unnecessary costs and 
delays for the parties involved and deters companies and citizens from making full use of the internal 
market”). See also Hess, Pfeiffer & Schlosser, supra note 41, at 232 (concluding that “creditors seeking the 
cross-border enforcement of small amounts of money are discouraged from a cross-border collection of 
their claims”). 
77 Fees for the declaration of enforceability differ considerably from member state to member 
state. See Hess, Pfeiffer & Schlosser, supra note 41, at 227-28. 
78 According to Article 55(2) of the Brussels I Regulation, a translation must be produced only 
“[i]f the court or competent authority so requires.” The purpose of this provision was to limit the need for 
translations to those occasions in which the court would otherwise be unable sufficiently to understand the 
relevant documents to determine whether or not there is an enforceable judgment. However, in practice, the 
courts of many member states, it turns out, routinely require the translation not only of the judgment itself, 
but of the opinion as well. Moreover, attorneys unsure of whether or not a translation will be required 
simply produce it so as to avoid wasting time with an appeal. See Hess, Pfeiffer & Schlosser, supra note 41, 
at 226-27. 
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one may quibble with this reasoning, the proposal effectively gets rid only of the 
requirement for a declaration of enforceability, not, however, the availability of a review 
of the judgment by court in the recognition state. Under the proposal, the judgment 
creditor retains the ability at any time to prevent enforcement by applying for an order to 
refuse enforcement on one of the remaining grounds against recognition, generally by the 
same court that currently adjudicates the appeal against the declaration of 
enforceability.80
 
The second proposed change, the limitation of the public policy defense to 
procedural irregularities, has been more controversial. It is based on a common separation 
of the public policy defense on the European Continent into substantive and procedural 
grounds for objection.81 The latter refers to serious violations of the recognition state’s 
standards of procedural fairness, the former to public policy violations resulting from the 
substantive law as applied. To the extent we know, there are few if any cases in the 
member states where substantive public policy was found to block the recognition or 
enforcement of a member-state judgment.82 From this, the Commission has concluded 
that substantive public policy no longer serves a useful purpose at a time of increasing 
reciprocal trust of the member states of their respective legal systems, but instead has the 
potential of generating unnecessary costs for judgment creditors.83 The proposal to 
abolish the public policy defense altogether has been around for a number of years, of 
course, and so has the debate over whether the member states are really ready to let go of 
this safety valve against judgments with which they disagree deeply.84 If judgment 
debtors are hardly ever successful with a claim of violation of substantive public policy, 
this does not necessarily mean that the exception serves no useful purpose. Instead, it 
 
 
 
79 No member state requires representation by counsel to obtain the declaration of enforceability. 
However, Article 40(2) of the Brussels I Regulation mandates that the judgment creditor “give an address 
for service of process within the area of jurisdiction of the court applied to.” It appears that judgment 
creditors frequently appoint local counsel for this purpose. Moreover, it is useful to retain local counsel 
with knowledge of local practice, which can differ significantly from country to country. However, in some 
of the member states, the costs of local counsel are borne by the judgment debtor if the application for a 
declaration of enforceability is granted. On all this see Hess, Pfeiffer & Schlosser, supra note 41, at 228-29; 
Oberhammer, supra note 41, at 198. 
80 See Proposed Brussels I Amendments, supra note 7, arts. 43 & 46. 
81 See, e.g., Stéphanie Francq, Art. 34, in EUROPEAN COMMENTARIES ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, supra note 44, 556, 568-78; Walter & Baumgartner, supra note 48, at 27. 
82 See Hess, Pfeiffer & Schlosser, supra note 41, at 249-50. 
83 See Proposed Brussels I Amendments, supra note 7, at 6. 
84 See Commission Communication to the Council and the European Parliament – Towards greater 
efficiency in obtaining and enforcing judgments in the European Union, COM(1997) 609 final, 1998 O.J. 
(C 33) 20, para. 20. 
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may simply demonstrate that the courts of the member states understand that this is a 
safety valve rarely to be applied.85
 
No less controversial is the proposal to abolish the defense of improper service of 
process against default judgments. It is in this area, the relevant studies have found, that 
most of the challenges to the recognition and enforcement of judgments still occur.86 
Apparently, however, the Commission has concluded that where problems with proper 
notice exist, it is better to have them remedied by the rendering court.87 Thus, in 
exchange for the abolition of the defense of improper service at the recognition stage, the 
proposal introduces, as a matter of EU law, the ability of the judgment debtor to reopen a 
default judgment in the rendering court for improper service under narrow 
circumstances.88 This is certainly in line with the significant narrowing of the defense 
from one that could be interpreted as being open against any irregular notice in the 
Brussels Convention89 to one that can be directed only against service of process that 
actually resulted in the defendant being unable to prepare a defense in adequate time in 
the Brussels I Regulation.90 The idea is clear: Although irregularities with proper service 
do appear to occur with some frequency, the courts of the rendering state are in a much 
better position than their counterparts in the recognition state to judge whether there 
really was a problem and, if so, to rectify it. Moreover, holding up enforcement 
proceedings in the recognition state with this task is unnecessary because we can trust the 
courts of the rendering state with it. The question, of course, is whether the litigating bar 
 
 
 
85 The ECJ made this abundantly clear in Régie nationale des usines Renault v. Maxicar SpA, 
2000 E.C.R. I-2973, paras. 30-33. 
86 See, e.g., Hess, Pfeiffer & Schlosser, supra note 41, at 239. 
87 See Proposed Brussels I Amendments, supra note 7, art. 45. 
88 Article 45(1) of the Proposed Brussels I Amendments, supra note 7, provides:  
A defendant who did not enter an appearance in the Member State of origin shall 
have the right to apply for a review of the judgment before the competent court of 
that Member State where: 
(a) he was not served with the document instituting the proceedings or an 
equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to 
arrange for his defence; or 
(b) he was prevented from contesting the claim by reason of force majeure or 
due to extraordinary circumstances without any fault on his part; 
Unless he failed to challenge the judgment when it was possible for him to do 
so. 
89 See Brussels Convention, supra note 10, art. 27(2) (proscribing recognition “if the defendant 
was not duly served … in sufficient time to enable him to arrange for his defense”). 
90 See supra text accompanying note 32 (primarily eliminating the word “duly”). 
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and public agrees with the proposition that the courts of the other member states can be 
trusted in this fashion. 
 
The abolition of the remaining cases in which the jurisdiction to adjudicate of the 
rendering court may be challenged is not surprising, given the attempt of the proposed 
changes to improve the free circulation of judgments. There have long been questions 
about why consumers and insurance policy owners should be able to get a second bite at 
the apple and why rendering courts from other member states cannot be trusted with a 
jurisdictional determination in those areas, while they can be in all others.91 However, 
these are also particularly vulnerable groups, and one may wonder whether requiring 
them to travel abroad to raise a jurisdictional defense against a claim brought by a foreign 
corporation is justified.92 Purely a matter of trust (and not one involving the protection of 
vulnerable groups) is the proposal to abolish the remaining jurisdictional defense where 
jurisdiction is exclusive according to Article 22 of the Brussels I Regulation. 
 
With regard to preliminary and protective measures, by contrast, the Commission 
is proposing not only an expansion but also a limitation of recognizable and enforceable 
measures. Seeking to overrule a long-standing interpretation of the Brussels Convention 
and the Brussels I Regulation by the ECJ,93 on the one hand, the Commission proposes to 
mandate that preliminary measures granted ex parte be recognized and enforced.94 The 
apparent reason is that, in practice, the current system forces plaintiffs in large-scale 
cases, especially in matters of intellectual property, to seek ex parte injunctions in each 
one of the member states in which immediate enforcement action is needed.95 There is 
 
 
 
91 See, e.g., GERHARD WALTER, INTERNATIONALES ZIVILPROZESSRECHT DER SCHWEIZ 442-43 (4th 
ed. 2007); Hess, Pfeiffer & Schlosser, supra note 41, at 283. On the extent to which a jurisdictional defense 
is available under the current version of the Brussels I Regulation see supra text accompanying note33-35. 
Note that, unlike in U.S. interstate practice (see, e.g., Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men’s Assn., 283 
U.S. 522, 524-27 (1931)), a challenge to the rendering court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate in those cases is 
currently possible according to Article 35 of the Brussels I Regulation whether or not the defendant 
challenged and litigated the jurisdictional question in the rendering court, although the rendering court’s 
factual determinations on jurisdiction are binding on the recognition court. 
92 See, e.g., Andrew Dickinson, The Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters (Recast) (“Brussels Ibis Regulation”) 10, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1930712. Note, however, that, under the current 
regime, the rendering court must establish its jurisdiction sua sponte where the defendant is domiciled in an 
EU member state but is sued in another member state and fails to appear. See Brussels I Regulation, supra 
note 8, at art. 26(1). 
93 See supra text accompanying note 46. 
94 See Proposed Brussels I Amendments, supra note 7, at 9. 
95 See, e.g., WALTER, supra note 91, at 431. 
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some potential for fraudulent activity here, but the Commission appears to assume, as it 
does with regard to improper service of process, that such problems can easily be 
addressed by the court of origin, once the defendant is given the opportunity – required 
by the proposed amendment – to challenge the measure there and that the court of origin 
should be trusted with remedying the situation. On the other hand, the proposal limits 
recognizability to those preliminary measures that emanate from a court “which by virtue 
of this Regulation has jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter.”96 The Commission 
thus attempts to eliminate the problems that have arisen with forum shopping for the 
expansive “preliminary” enforcement measures that are available in some member states 
with otherwise little connection to the litigated dispute.97 Following through with the 
principles of trust and increased mobility, the Commission assumes that it is desirable to 
require plaintiffs to travel to the forum with jurisdiction in the main proceedings to obtain 
preliminary measures that are enforceable outside of the jurisdiction granting such 
measures – the same way we can expect defendants to challenge allegedly defective 
judgments in the (foreign) rendering state rather than wait for recognition or enforcement 
proceedings at home.98
 
Considerably more surprising, finally, is the Commission’s proposal to subject 
defendants from non-member states essentially to the same jurisdictional regime as 
defendants who are domiciled within a member state. Currently, the Brussels I 
Regulation proceeds from the assumption, as did the Brussels Convention, that only 
defendants having their domicile within a member state of the European Union are to be 
protected from litigation pending in jurisdictions other than the defendant’s domicile that 
have few if any relevant connections to the claim.99 Its jurisdictional rules are thus 
limited to cases in which the defendant is domiciled in a member state.100 Yes, this 
approach does discriminate against defendants from non-member states, such as the 
United States, particularly when combined with the rule that judgments against such 
 
 
 
96 See Proposed Brussels I Amendments, supra note 7, art. 2(a). 
97 See Proposed Brussels I Amendments, supra note 7, at 9 and supra text accompanying note 45. 
98 The proposal further requires that “if proceedings on the substance are pending in one court and 
another one is asked to issue a provisional measure, [] the two courts cooperate in order to ensure that all 
circumstances of the case are taken into account when a provisional measure is granted.” Proposed Brussels 
I Amendments, supra note 7, at 9. 
99 Unlike the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court under the Due Process Clause, the 
jurisdictional rules of the Brussels I Regulation and the ECJ case law interpreting them has focused not on 
the relationship between the forum and the defendant but between the forum and the claim for purposes of 
establishing specific jurisdiction outside of general jurisdiction (in the case of the Brussels I Regulation) at 
the domicile of the defendant. See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER, supra note 12, at 168. 
100 See supra text accompanying notes 19-28. 
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defendants based on an exorbitant jurisdictional rule from one member state generally 
must be recognized and enforced in the others.101 But such is the privilege of those who 
fashion the rules for a particular jurisdiction – in this case the Common Market – and it 
can be neutralized with the equally existing privilege of non-member states to negotiate a 
jurisdiction and judgments treaty with the European Union.102 That there is a privilege to 
fashion the rules of transnational litigation the way a jurisdiction sees fit, of course, does 
not mean that it is smart to exercise that privilege without considering the potential 
transnational consequences.103
 
However, the Commission has decided that the focus on protecting European 
defendants and the concomitant incentive for other nations (especially the United States) 
to come to the negotiating table are no longer the only policies behind the Brussels I 
Regulation in cases involving litigants from non-member states. Instead, the Commission 
points out that the current system leads to unequal access for plaintiffs from the European 
Union to member state courts in cases against defendants from non-member states.104 
This is not only because the exorbitant jurisdictional bases available in the member states 
differ in reach, but also because the domestic jurisdictional law of some member states 
provides for jurisdictional bases that are similar or equal to those in the Brussels I 
Regulation while those of other states are considerably more limited.105 The Commission 
thus proposes both to make the jurisdictional bases of the Brussels I Regulation available 
against defendants from non-member states and to prohibit the use of the exorbitant bases 
of jurisdiction currently available against such defendants.106 However, unlike the rules 
applicable to defendants from member states, the proposal suggests adopting two 
additional bases of jurisdiction against defendants from non-member states. First is 
jurisdiction based on the ownership of property within the relevant member state, thus 
providing for a limited form of exorbitant jurisdiction that is equally available in all 
 
 
 
101 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
102 See, e.g., Clermont & Palmer, supra note 26, at [6-7]; Kathryn A. Russel, Exorbitant 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments: The Brussels System as an Impetus for United States Action, 
19 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 57, 59-60 (1993). The claim by the drafters of the Restatement (Third) of 
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States that there may be limitations on exorbitant bases of 
jurisdiction deriving from customary international law has remained with little support. Cf. RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 421, cmt. e (positing that “jurisdiction 
based on service of process on a person only transitorily in the territory of the state is not generally 
acceptable under international law”). 
103 See supra text accompanying notes 3-4. 
104 See Proposed Brussels I Amendments, supra note 7, at 3. 
105 See, e.g., Nuyts, supra note 25, at 19-21 (2007). 
106 See Proposed Brussels I Amendments, supra note 7, at 8. 
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jurisdictions.107 The second is a forum necessitatis, permitting plaintiffs from EU 
member states to sue defendants from non-member states in any member state that has a 
sufficient connection with the dispute if no forum is reasonably available elsewhere in the 
world.108 Depending on the country, this proposal thus either limits or expands the types 
of cases in which U.S. defendants may be sued in that jurisdiction, whose judgment must 
then be recognized and enforced by the other member states. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
When it comes to transnational litigation, the European Union has been on a roll. 
The Brussels regime on jurisdiction and recognition of judgments, once the only source 
of European law on transnational litigation and one that was relegated to a treaty outside 
the Community legal framework, has become one of many EU legal instruments in this 
area. Even with regard specifically to the recognition and enforcement of judgments from 
other member states, the Brussels I Regulation is no longer the only piece of EU 
legislation, although it probably remains the most important one. Indeed, the 
development seems to move into the direction of adopting European law for all of 
transnational litigation, from the filing of the complaint to the modalities of enforcing 
judgments in cross border cases.109 For the time being, however, litigants from countries 
outside of the Union, such as the United States, face a growing overlap of domestic law, 
EU regulations, and ECJ case law when trying to figure out if and where they can sue and 
be sued within the Community and whether a judgment for or against them will be 
recognized and enforced in the other member states. From this perspective, the 
Commission’s proposal to subject defendants from non-member states (mostly) to the 
same bases of jurisdiction to adjudicate as defendants from member states would bring 
some relief. Jurisdiction over defendants from non-member states would then be 
determined by EU law rather than by the internal law of the member states, as is currently 
the case.110 At first blush, this seems to be good news for defendants from the United 
 
 
 
107 Id. at art. 25. Permitting citizens or domiciliaries to bring suit against foreigners who own 
property within the forum state, which can then be used to enforce a resulting judgment, is likely to be the 
primary reason behind the existence of most exorbitant bases of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Clermont & Palmer, 
supra note 26, at [16-18]. 
108 Id. at art. 26. In the United States, the Supreme Court has twice refused to consider adoption of 
a forum of necessity on the facts before it when the minimum contacts required by the due process clause 
were otherwise missing. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 419 n.13 
(1984); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 n.37 (1977). 
109 On all this see supra text accompanying notes 48-68. 
110 See supra text accompanying notes 99-108. 
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States for the additional reason that the effect of this proposal would be to outlaw the use 
of exorbitant bases of jurisdiction under domestic member state law that are currently 
available against such defendants. However, it is less than clear that this would lead to an 
overall limitation of jurisdiction against U.S. defendants in all member states since the 
proposal also includes both a new assets jurisdiction and a new necessity jurisdiction 
specifically against non-Community defendants, and since the Brussels I Regulation’s 
jurisdictional bases themselves reach farther than some of the jurisdictional rules of the 
member states.111
 
The European Union has particularly been on a roll in the area of judgments 
recognition. The purpose of the Brussels Convention of 1968 was primarily to harmonize 
and to some extent to liberalize the recognition of judgments from other member 
states.112 Since 1999, however, the goal has been to achieve the free movement of 
judgments, whereby judgments from other member states are treated no differently than 
judgments from courts within the same member state, that is, without any need for 
recognition or a declaration of enforceability.113 The proposed changes to the Brussels I 
Regulation go a long way toward achieving this goal. This is particularly true of the 
proposed elimination of the defenses of improper notice, “substantive” public policy, and 
lack of jurisdiction to adjudicate (in the few cases that remain in the current version of the 
Brussels I Regulation).114 This is good news for judgment creditors from the United 
States, less so for our judgment debtors. For it will be even less advisable than it already 
is to default on a claim brought in a member state court in the hope that the resulting 
judgment can be collaterally attacked later. For the most part, collateral attacks will no 
longer be available in the other member states. Moreover, the number of countries where 
the judgment can be recognized and enforced in this fashion is constantly growing. 
Already, there are five more countries that are on the list of candidates for membership in 
the European Union.115 And the Lugano Convention extends the current regime of the 
Brussels I Regulation to three additional states,116 with the EU assessing the possibility of 
getting other important trading partners, including from outside of Europe, to sign on to 
the Lugano Convention.117 However, it is questionable whether the proposed changes and 
 
 
 
111 See Proposed Brussels I Amendments, supra note 7, at 8 and supra text accompanying note 
105. 
112 See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER, supra note 12, at 62-63. 
113 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
114 See supra text accompanying notes 86-90. 
115 See supra note 6. 
116 See supra text accompanying 17-18. 
117 See Stockholm Programme, supra note 56, at 17. 
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certainly further future changes to the Brussels I Regulation are likely to make it into new 
versions of the Lugano Convention since those changes are increasingly intertwined with 
Community law in other areas as well as with important (constitutional) Community 
obligations, such the freedoms of movement for goods, services, persons, and capital and 
the duty to cooperate.118
 
Overall, then, attorneys representing litigants from the United States are well 
advised to study both the current and the proposed set of rules on recognition and 
enforcement in the European Union carefully or retain competent local counsel well 
ahead of time. For U.S. law reformers, on the other hand, there is both good news and 
bad here. The good news is that, despite the complex overlay of EU law, national law, 
and ECJ jurisprudence, the law of transnational litigation in the European Union is 
increasingly uniform and thus is becoming easier to study for purposes of predicting the 
transnational effects of potential U.S. reforms, such as the proposed federal legislation on 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.119 In case the United States 
considers the further negotiation of treaties in this area, there is the additional benefit that 
the European Union now possesses exclusive power to negotiate to the extent those 
negotiations would in any way affect the Brussels regime.120 That is, the United States 
would face one partner in that part of the world rather than 27, each with partly disparate 
goals, as was the case during the negotiations for a Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and 
Judgments in the 1990s.121 Given the long history of U.S. impatience in this area – 
impatience with foreign solutions, impatience with foreign countries resisting the 
 
 
 
118 See, e.g., BURKHARD HESS, EUROPÄISCHES ZIVIPROZESSRECHT 198-99 (2010). But see 
Alexander Markus, Probleme der EuGVVO-Revision: Begriff der Entscheidung und Abschaffung des 
Exequaturverfahrens, in INNOVATIVES RECHT: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR IVO SCHWANDER 747, 748 (Franco 
Lorandi & Daniel Stähelin eds., 2011) (expressing hope that the European authorities will be open to 
renegotiations of the Lugano Convention for this purpose so as to meet a strong interest of (Swiss) 
practitioners in the field). 
119 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: 
ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE (2006) [hereinafter ALI PROPOSAL]; U.S. House of 
Representatives, Subcommittee on Courts, Commercial and Administrative Law, Hearing on Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, Nov. 15, 2011, available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear_11152011_2.html. 
120 See Case C-1-03, 2006 E.C.R. I-1145. 
121 It would also make it considerably more difficult for the Europeans simply to outvote the 
United States where they view their interests as counter to those of the United States, as happened in the 
negotiations of the proposed Hague Judgments and Jurisdiction convention. See, e.g., Arthur T. von 
Mehren, Drafting a Convention on International Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign Judgments 
Acceptable World-wide: Can the Hague Conference Project Succeed?, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 191, 202 (2001). 
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preferred U.S. approach, and impatience with the time and effort necessary for successful 
treaty negotiation – this is likely to be a considerable benefit.122
 
The bad news is that the focus of all the activity at the EU level has been on inter-
Community transnational litigation with little attention paid to litigation involving 
connections to non-member states. Thus, while the EU is getting increasingly close in the 
area of recognition of judgments from other member states to the goal of the free 
movement of such judgments, the member state law applicable to the recognition of 
judgments from the United States has, in some jurisdictions, remained at the stage of 
circa 1900.123 Since the member states have entered into (mostly bilateral) treaties with 
their most important non-EU trading partners (except the United States), these laws are 
primarily designed to deal with judgments from sub-standard legal regimes and many of 
them provide numerous opportunities to block recognition of U.S. judgments.124 Yes, the 
United States can try to deal with this problem in the tried and true fashion of applying 
unilateral pressure, in this case by (re-)introducing a reciprocity defense into its 
recognition law.125 However, not only is this approach likely to create all kinds of 
problems,126 including the potential of hurting litigants from the United States as 
litigation abroad, including litigation by U.S. plaintiffs, becomes more frequent.127 The 
sorry state of the European member-state recognition law applicable to U.S. judgments 
should be compelling evidence that the U.S. approach of applying unilateral pressure 
while staying out of international entanglements may yield unpleasant results.128 Perhaps, 
then, it is time for the United States to warm up to the idea of negotiating treaties in this 
area and to do so with patience and, preferably (at least initially), one country (or 
supranational organization) at a time.129 The problem with negotiating with the European 
Union, of course, will be that the longer the Europeans focus on lawmaking for intra-
 
 
 
122 See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER, supra note 12, at 69-70; Stephen B. Burbank, The Reluctant Partner: 
Making Procedural Law for International Civil Litigation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 139-41 
(Summer 1994). 
123 See, e.g., Baumgartner, U.S. Judgments, supra note 5, at 180. 
124 See id. at 181-82. 
125 See ALI PROPOSAL, supra note 119, §7. 
126 One need only study the long list of complexities created by the reciprocity requirement in a 
country, such as Germany, that has had such a requirement on the books for decades. See, e.g., DIETER 
MARTINY, III/1 HANDBUCH DES INTERNATIONALEN ZIVILVERFAHRENSRECHTS 523-80 (1984). 
127 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
128 For an account of this approach, see, for example, BAUMGARTNER, supra note 12, at 21-45. 
129 See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, A Global Law of Jurisdiction and Judgments: Views from the 
United States and Japan, 37 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 24-26 (2004). 
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Community litigation and the more they think uniformly about external relations, the 
more single-minded, powerful, and perhaps unpalatable their proposed solutions may 
become from a U.S. perspective. The proposed changes to the Brussels I Regulation’s 
jurisdictional regime, for example, are not meant to benefit defendants from non-member 
states, but rather to improve access to justice for EU plaintiffs.130 And the relatively 
recent decision to point non-EU trading partners to the Lugano Convention,131 potentially 
more and more to the exclusion of other negotiable options,132 may not be a palatable or 
even feasible way forward from a U.S. point of view.133 Thus, the sooner such 
negotiations take place, the better. 
 
 
 
130 See supra text accompanying notes 104-108. 
131 See supra text accompanying note 117. 
132 For the time being, the European Council does believe that “the option of bilateral agreements 
should be explored, on a case-by-case basis;” but only “where no legal framework is in place for relations 
between the Union and partner countries, and where the development of new multilateral cooperation is not 
possible from the Union’s standpoint.” Stockholm Programme, supra note 56, at 17. Of course, the Lugano 
Convention may be viewed as just such a framework. 
133 See, e.g., von Mehren, supra note 36, at 280-81. 
 
 
